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Abstract 
Diversity of trajectories of post-socialist transforming economies is a stylized fact of this experience of 
system change. The paper explores the relations between change in formal and informal rules in historical 
perspective, discussing new institutional views about rationality of formal institutions and detrimental 
inertia of informal institutions. It submits that an open and complex approach of the centrality of 
formal/informal rules interaction may give a better explanation to the multiplicity of national post-
socialist pathways. 
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1.  Introduction 
The wide-ranging experiences of post-socialist transformation in about 30 
countries during the 1990s and 2000s have led to a number of surprises and puzzles for 
the social sciences. Two stylized facts of transformation are the striking diversity of 
national paths of change and the general importance of informal relations and rules, 
even though the process of system change from socialism to capitalism has generally 
been understood as a process of rationalization and formalization.  
The variety of trajectories of transformation has been remarkable indeed, be it 
observed at the national level (Chavance and Magnin 1997; Magnin, 1999; Van de 
Mortel 2002; Lane, Myant, 2007) or at a more aggregate level where the differences or 
contrasts between a Central European, a post-Soviet and an Asian trajectory are 
apparent. The specific and evolving relations between formal and informal institutional 
change have been a key element in the array of causes of such an emerging and enduring 
variety. 
The role of informal relations and rules has been underlined in numerous 
analyses of a wide range of phenomena: networks, social norms and values in general, 
but also spontaneous privatization, corruption, cronyism, mafia-ization, tunneling, 
arrears, labor hoarding, barter, tax evasion, informal economy or, on the other hand, 
trust, social capital, new work and business ethics and informal cooperation. The 
manifest significance of the informal realm in systemic change has contributed to a 
gradual shift in economic theory from a de-institutionalized and market-centered 
analysis to a more institutional approach. 
The distinction and interaction between the formal and informal dimensions of 
social relations have long been analyzed by social theorists, particularly from the legal 
and sociological tradition but also by economic theorists dealing with institutions. 
Weber (1921) observed that the relationship between informal behavioral regularities 
and formal rules is complex and reciprocal. Commons (1934) wrote that customs are 
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produced spontaneously and that authoritative figures operate an “artificial selection” 
among them in trying to manage conflict, leading to formal and legitimized rules; this is 
the “common law method,” which is at work in the numerous going concerns that 
constitute capitalist society (including the larger going concern, the state). Hayek (1973, 
1988) emphasized (informal) law or moral rules that had evolved over long periods 
before some were eventually transformed into legislation; beneficial informal rules were 
principally subject to a kind of selection through “cultural evolution” that was neither 
natural nor artificial. In his analysis of institutional evolution, North (1990) stressed the 
distinction between formal and informal constraints, with the latter both underlying and 
supplementing the former. 
In examining the historical experience of post-socialist transformation, this 
question has recently been recognized as an important dimension of wide-scale 
organizational and institutional change. Different views of these interactions have been 
put forward in economic analyses of systemic change. In this paper, I discuss new 
institutional views about the relationship between formal and informal institutional 
change,2 in order to explore how such analyses may contribute to clarifying questions 
concerning the variety of transformational pathways and national forms of post-socialist 
capitalism. 
2.  Diversity of Transformation Trajectories and Path-Dependence 
The search for commonalities in transformation experience may be carried out 
at various levels of abstraction. The lowest implies a comparison directly based on the 
national level of about 30 countries or a subgroup of them. The highest level of 
abstraction concerns “system change” in general (e.g. Kornai 2000). An intermediate 
level may deal with strong similarities within groups of countries that have experienced 
similar trajectories. The dominant transition doctrine initially applied a uniform analysis 
and strategy to most national cases (this excludes the Asian countries). Later, the 
contrasts among the various experiences were acknowledged but remained under-
theorized in the mainstream approach.3  
The broad experience of post-socialist transformation has not resulted until now 
in a consensual set of stylized facts among the different schools of thought, that may 
serve as a basis for various theories to test the light they can shed on such epochal 
change. The variety of trajectories in different economies and the diversity of post-
socialist national capitalisms partly explain such a paradoxical situation. Different 
generalizations have been attempted about “transition” in general, but they remain 
unsatisfactory as they can often be refuted by one or more national counter-examples. 
Most of the time they rely on one or a few national experiences deemed “typical,” but 
fail to take into account contrasting paths of transformation. In order to draw “general 
lessons” from the transformation processes so far, the challenge of diversity has to be 
faced, and more inductive analysis has to be done of the variety of experiences that have 
                                                 
2 Here, institutions will be interpreted as social rules, and formal and informal rules will be treated as 
equivalent to formal and informal institutions. For a more detailed discussion of the concept of 
institution, see Chavance (2008) 
3 Roland (2000) lists national “differences” as stylised facts about transition: differences in reform paths 
and strategies; differences in macroeconomic performance after liberalization; and differences in 
enterprise performance in response to changes in ownership and corporate governance. But besides the 
fact that the “performance” itself  should be problematized (see below), differences in performance 
should be related to differences in institutional configurations of post-socialist capitalisms.  
 




Available online at http://eaces.liuc.it 
59
surfaced. If not, we face the risk of wrongly generalizing from just one specific or partial 
experience or period, without dealing with historical specificity (Hodgson 2001) as a 
necessary component of general theorization. 
3.  Formal and Informal Institutional Change 
In the recent period we find two influential but contrasted ways to conceptualize 
the relation of informal and formal rules or institutions.  
The first is Hayek’s theory of law. It is influenced by the common law experience 
and sees law (like morals) as evolved abstract rules that have been selected through a 
lengthy historical process of cultural evolution, where the advantageous rules have been 
filtered through group selection (Hayek 1988). Deliberate legislation may be positive 
inasmuch as it codifies — or remains compatible with — evolved general rules of 
conduct, or perfects them at the margins without replacing them with teleological and 
instrumental organizational rules that are totally unfit for an extended, spontaneous 
order (Hayek 1973). Followers of this line of thought consequently give great weight to 
informal, evolved rules, and view formal, deliberate ones as beneficial only when they 
correspond closely to the former. But formal rules may reflect a constructivist attempt 
to build an extended order following the pattern of a teleological organization, in which 
case they will endanger society and economy.  
The second prominent theory is North’s view of institutional change (North 
1990). In his influential book, North distinguishes between formal and informal 
institutions, and underlines the inertial character of the latter. He writes about 
alterations produced by discontinuous institutional change, such as revolution or 
conquest: “What is most striking (although seldom observed, particularly by advocates 
of revolution) is the persistence of so many aspects of a society in spite of a total change 
in the [formal] rules” (North 1990, p. 36). Defining institutions as constraints, he notes 
that “informal constraints that are culturally derived will not change immediately in 
reaction to changes in the formal rules,” leading to a “tension between altered formal 
rules and the persisting informal constraints” (North 1990, p. 45). While changes in 
formal rules are made and enforced by the polity, informal constraints are linked to 
cultural inheritance. North also strongly criticizes the mainstream approach to 
transition, emphasizing the limits to our understanding of institutional change, and 
opposing “a certain amount of hubris evident in the annual surveys of the World Bank 
and in the writings of orthodox economists who think we now have it right” (North 
1997, p. 15), adding that “path-dependence can and will produce a wide variety of 
patterns of development, depending on the cultural heritage and specific historical 
experience of [each] country” (North 1997, p. 17). Another limit of orthodoxy is the 
lack of consideration of enforcement of formal rules: “Economies that adopt the formal 
rules of another economy will have very different performance” because of “different 
informal norms and enforcement” characteristics (North, 1994, p. 366). This 
discrepancy results in putting limits on expected revolutionary (formal) changes and in 
disappointment in terms of performance when imitating formal rules of successful 
countries.  
Authors influenced by the Northian approach have a rather critical view of 
informal rules, often regarding them as a negative legacy of the past, and more readily 
admit that the correct or «  adaptively  » efficient combination of formal 
rules/enforcement characteristics/informal rules is not known in the present state of 
institutional economics.  
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Table 1: Formal and Informal Rules in Two Theories of Change 
 Hayek  North 
Formal rules  Legislation ought to correspond 
to evolved (informal) law 
Laws, constitutions: often imitated from 
successful countries 
Informal rules 
Evolved and selected through 
cultural evolution, generally 
beneficial (constitute tradition); 
underlie formal rules but are 
effective beyond them 
Norms of behavior, conventions, self-
imposed codes of conduct (constitute 
culture); generally underlie and 
supplement formal constraints 
Potential 
conflicts 
Legislation contradicts  
evolved law 
Rapid change in formal rules with 
inertial informal rules 
Consequence of 
conflict 
Constructivist attempts threaten 
the beneficial spontaneous order 
of society or the market 
Revolutionary changes do not follow 








Focuses only on formal rules change, 
overlooks problems of their 
enforcement and the inertia of informal 
rules  
Doctrinal 
background  Economic liberalism  Historical new economic 
institutionalism 
  
These two theories have influenced the new institutional economists’ attempts 
to interpret and guide the post-socialist transformation. As they are not directly 
compatible, tentative syntheses giving more weight to one or the other do not give 
convincing conclusions. Moreover, such syntheses have been blended with various 
degrees of neo-liberal confidence in the market as such, adding an element of 
heterogeneity to conclusions.  
The first theory runs into serious difficulty when the « transition » to a capitalist 
order is at stake, as this starts from a revolutionary upheaval and not from a historical 
incremental evolution; the second may appear one-sided in treating informal institutions 
(equated with cultural legacies) primarily as obstacles to progressive change.4  
4.  Extension of Formal/Informal Distinction 
Several authors have elaborated on the Northian distinction between formal and 
informal institutions against the backdrop of the highly diverse and complex experiences 
of post-socialist change in many countries. A number of authors have extended the new 
institutionalist view in terms of the interplay between formal and informal rules. 
Pejovich (1999, p. 170) has put forward the “interaction thesis,” where different 
instances of relations are distinguished: 1) Formal institutions suppress, but fail to 
change informal institutions; 2) Formal rules directly conflict with informal rules; 3) 
Formal rules are either ignored or rendered neutral; and 4) “Formal and informal rules 
cooperate” — as in cases where the state institutionalizes informal rules that had 
evolved spontaneously. Pejovich observes: “When formal rules conflict with the 
prevailing informal rules, the interaction of their incentives will tend to raise transaction 
costs and reduce the production of wealth in the community” (Pejovich 1999, p. 171).  
                                                 
4 Building on the German tradition of Ordoliberalism might have reduced some contradictions in neo-
liberal approaches to  system change, but it has been barely present in transition debates. According to 
Leipold (2001), scrutiny of the political process and of the role of informal rules has been absent from 
this tradition.  
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In a discussion on norms and networks, Nee (1998) differentiates between 
congruent, decoupled and opposition (informal) norms according to their relations with 
formal rules. Congruent norms are closely coupled with formal rules, and both are 
mutually reinforcing. Decoupled norms allow activities to vary according to practical 
considerations while retaining formal structures, which may become largely ceremonial. 
Opposition norms encourage direct resistance to formal rules. According to Nee, the 
first relationship promotes, while the third is highly detrimental to economic 
performance. 
Defining institutions as rules accompanied by an enforcement mechanism, Voigt 
and Engerer (2001) describe external institutions as rules sanctioned by the state and 
internal institutions as rules sanctioned by members of society. While not identical to 
the distinction between formal and informal rules (as the case of private rules linked to 
organized private enforcement may actually refer to formal internal rules), there is a 
strong overlap between the two definitions. 
 
Table 2: Internal and External Institutions 
Nature of rule  Nature of enforcement  Type of institution 
1. Convention  Self-enforcing  Type 1 — internal 
2. Ethical rule  Self-commitment of actor  Type 2 — internal 
3. Customs  Via informal societal control  Type 3 — internal 
4. Private rule  Organized private enforcement Type 4 — internal 
5. State law  Organized state enforcement  External 
Source: Voigt and Engerer (2001) 
 
The authors define four kinds of relationships between internal and external 
rules: neutral; complementary; substitutive (non-compliance is sanctioned either by the 
state or by private individuals); and conflicting. Complementarity is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for economic success: everything depends on the content of an 
institution. Internal institutions change more slowly than external ones, as they are not 
subject to deliberate choice mechanisms. 
Winiecki (2000), in a similar way to Pejovich, stresses the interaction between 
formal and informal rules, with the latter generally displaying resilience. The harmony 
between the two types of rules conditions economic success in the long term; however, 
discordance may prevail to varying degrees. Informal rules can slow down the positive 
effects of new formal rules, but they may also limit the negative consequences of new 
formal rules that are misguided. Winiecki defends the shock therapy approach and 
expresses reservation towards formal rules in general (he mentions an “institutional 
Laffer curve,” where beyond a certain threshold, formal regulations exercise a negative 
effect on wealth creation). A limited number of formal rules should, thanks to 
decentralization, allow for flexible evolution in informal rules (Winiecki 2000, p. 160–
161). Winiecki opposes gradualism on the grounds that a critical mass of formal rule 
change is initially needed, and also because the “market for institutions” proposed by 
Pejovich (which implies a co-existence of different types of rules), is based on a false 
analogy with the emergence of capitalism (Winiecki 1998, p. 21). 
Katharina Pistor, distinguishing between formal and informal law, notes that 
both tend to be complementary when they evolve over time, but in political and 
economic regime change, new formal and pre-existing informal institutions compete or 
operate independently (Pistor 2000, p. 4). Law is usually neutral, contrary to Marx’s  
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superstructure thesis, but it is not neutral in regime change, as existing socio-economic 
and political control rights are re-allocated (Pistor 2000, p. 9). Pistor seems inclined to 
follow North concerning power as a causal force on formal institutional change, 
contrary to authors like Winiecki or Pejovich, who mainly concentrate on 
formal/informal relations or have an efficiency-centered approach to formal rules,5 but 
she limits the validity of this notion to “regime change.”  
In the second half of the 1990s, the initial transition doctrine itself was 
somewhat modified. The importance of legal frameworks, administrative capacity and 
the enforcement of formal rules were underlined (Sachs and Pistor 1997). A number of 
“soft concepts” (Sztompka 1999) were also developed and studied, such as trust, social 
capital, etc. “Institutional” rhetoric became dominant. 
5.  Successive Periods of Change 
The interdependence between changes in formal rules, their enforcement, and 
informal rules has assumed different forms during consecutive periods of socialist 
reform and post-socialist transformation.  
If we consider the Central European countries, schematically distinguishing the 
last decade of socialism as pre-revolutionary, the first three years as revolutionary, the 
twelve following years as post-revolutionary (taking accession to the European Union in 
2004 as the symbolic marker) and the following period as evolutionary, we have the 
Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Four Periods of Change in Central Europe 
Periods Formal  rules  Enforcement 
of formal rules Informal rules 
Pre-revolutionary 
Significant but partial 
changes in reforming 
countries*, limited 
change in others 
Uneven, often 
decreasing 
Fast and opportunistic changes 
in reforming countries, slow 
but real changes in others 
Revolutionary 
Radical, wide-ranging 
and extended systemic 
changes 
Generally weak 
Fast, opportunistic and 















Opportunistic change, learning 
processes in stabilizing formal 
framework (intra-systemic 
uncertainty) 




Changes principally through 
learning processes, gradual 
innovations 
* Poland and Hungary (in the 1980s). 
 
But let us turn to the Asian experience of China and Vietnam, where the system 
shift took place through a protracted evolutionary process, without any clear 
                                                 
5 Winiecki (2000, p. 150) refers to “cost-benefit calculation” concerning the introduction  of new formal 
rules over time.  
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revolutionary period.6 While differences arose in the chronology and process of change 
of the two countries, a somewhat similar sequence could be observed.7 We can 
schematically distinguish a first period where formal socialist institutions and rules were 
relaxed, with decollectivization in agriculture and emergence of a small private or quasi-
private sector, a second stage where dual-track reforms with dual price system and 
partial external opening took place, a third period where radical changes in formal rules 
and institutions were extended (touching state ownership and administration, the 
banking system, the monopoly of foreign trade), and a fourth period which can be 
roughly assessed as post-socialist where formal capitalist institutions are developed, like 
a dominance of private or quasi private ownership, capital markets, etc. This may be 
summarized in the Table 4. 
 
Table 4. Four Periods of Change in Asia 
Periods Formal  rules 
Enforcement of 













Fast changes following 





Changes intended at 
controlling a 
piecemeal reduction of 
the state sector and 






(speculation on prices, 




Changes intended to 




depending on domains 
considered; 









Extension of formal 
capitalist institutions 
Consolidation, uneven 





gradual or swift 
innovations 
 
These periodizations are assuredly schematic, but they help to underline that the 
general interdependence between changes in formal rules, their enforcement, and 
informal rules, while central to all trajectories of post-socialist transformation, 
contributes through context- and specially path-dependence to the diversity of processes 
and configurations of system change. Concentrating on such causes of institutional 
change variety may help to adopt a less deterministic approach than those used in some 
new institutional economics (NIE) theories. 
                                                 
6 Continuity has prevailed in the formal political system, - even though it has undergone significant 
changes (Walder, 1995)  ; consequently no clear-cut starting point of the economic system 
transformation can be defined. Lubman (1996) nevertheless mentions a “legislative explosion” in 
China’s legal reforms. 
7  Among a vast literature, let us mention Naughton (2006), Beresford (2001) and Paquet (2004).  
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6.  Rationality of Formal Rules? 
In a number of NIE accounts of system change, new formal rules are seen as 
unproblematic as they are deemed rational and beneficial in principle. The main 
difficulty comes from informal rules, their resilience and lack of rationality. 
Capitalism as a target model of transformation actually entails various levels of 
formality. There are different degrees of generality and specificity in formal institutions. 
For instance, private ownership of the means of production is a highly general 
institution that has taken numerous concrete forms in historical and present types of 
capitalism. As the literature on the diversity of contemporary capitalisms has shown, a 
variety of formal institutional configurations prevails and endures in different national 
contexts (Berger, Dore, 1996; Hollingsworth, Boyer, 1997; Hall, Soskice, 2001; Amable 
2003). Consequently, the introduction and development of formal rules typical of 
capitalism in general in the post-socialist countries have assumed multiple forms 
according to the political context, and the influence of foreign models and international 
organizations.8 
New formal rules can create problems of their own due to a number of reasons: 
they may have a low level of legitimacy, lack robust complementarity with other formal 
institutions, or produce unexpected and undesirable consequences.9 The revolutionary 
and early post-revolutionary periods in Central Europe highlighted a significant 
instability in formal rules, with legislation frequently changed following internal conflict, 
external pressure or unanticipated consequences,10 the prevalence of a kind of 
transitional anomie (not in the sense of a lack of formal rules but in the sense of weak 
stability and learning), and systemic uncertainty11 (reduced by the teleological 
representation of the market economy). 
Original institutional economics rightly argued that institutions in general — 
including formal ones — incorporate both knowledge and ignorance (Hamilton 1932). 
These formal institutions thus have an ambivalent effect on economic actors, their 
behavior and interactions.  
                                                 
8 While the Washington consensus promoted by the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development and the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development was dominant in the first period in Eastern and Central Europe, other international 
organizations (mostly linked with the United Nations), like the Economic Commission for Europe, tried 
to promote different policies or institutions despite being less influential. The International Labor 
Organization (ILO), for instance, served as a reference for the creation of tripartite councils to negotiate 
between governments, trade unions and employer organizations in most Central European countries in 
the early 1990s.  As these bodies were at cross purposes with the dominant neo-liberal trend, they 
declined or disappeared from the scene after some time. 
9  This has been the case, for instance, with different schemes of mass privatization. 
10 For instance, early provisions for social protection, unemployment, etc., were soon reduced in many 
countries, privatization rules were frequently reshuffled, and tax rules took quite some time to be 
stabilized. 
11 Referring to Poland in the first half of the 1990s, Sztompka writes: “The general feeling of uncertainty 
is also due to normative disorganization or anomie. The legal system is a fragmented mosaic of partial-
regulations, old and new, often inconsistent, repeatedly changed, and arbitrarily interpreted. The 
overload of rules, regulations, administrative codes, and conflicting interpretation of laws makes them 
incomprehensible. The next constitution is still missing, as twenty-seven projects are vigorously debated 
by a divided parliament, and the old one is a patchwork of ad hoc amendments. The rule of law is 
compromised by extra-legal decisions of the highest authorities, including the presidential office, and by 
the retroactive legislation occasionally passed by the parliament. Trust in the continuity, stability, and 
orderliness of social life is effectively undermined.” (Sztompka 1999, p. 77)  
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The notion that new formal rules constitute, in principle, a rational and 
beneficial anchor of systemic change is consequently somewhat misleading.12 It is a 
simplification to put all the burden of difficulties observed in system change on informal 
institutions or on the enforcement of formal ones. 
7.  Inertial Informality 
The reduction of informal rules to culture is sometimes deemed to explain 
development and performance, resulting in a kind of culturalist fallacy. Pejovich writes 
that “the culture of collectivism and egalitarianism in Central and Eastern Europe is 
stronger the farther east and southeast one travels. The interaction thesis suggests that 
differences in transaction costs arising from those cultural differences within the region 
explain differences in the results of transition” (Pejovich 2003, p. 351). He contends that 
“research and empirical evidence show that the ranking of countries with respect to 
economic freedoms correlates with their respective economic performances” (Pejovich 
2003, p. 351). However, he forgot to travel further east, where transforming Asian 
countries — in which “economic freedoms” are not so conspicuous and where 
egalitarianism also has a long tradition — provide a refutation of his assessment. 
Culturalist theories are sometimes tautological. Japan’s backwardness in terms of 
capitalist development has for a long period been attributed to its Confucian culture 
(following Weber’s thesis), while later that same culture has been called upon as an 
explanation of Japan’s capitalist success (Morishima 1982).  
Culture is a general concept; in the same society we find various “cultures” with 
different temporalities of change (e.g. long-term pre-socialist, socialist and late socialist 
cultures). Cultural change, extinction, revival and creation are dependent on the 
historical context. In some senses systemic change is accompanied by a “cultural 
revolution,” which does not preclude, as do all revolutions, strands of continuity. 
Informal rules are formed at numerous levels of economic life and action.13 
Some have a cultural and long-standing nature, but many have a limited time span and a 
remote or weak relationship with cultural values and rules. While some are highly 
resilient, the degree of inertia varies considerably at different levels of economy and 
society, and in diverse periods of evolutionary or revolutionary change. Post-socialist 
transformation has not taken place in a uniform way in informal institutions: enduring 
legacies have co-existed with the rapid collapse of unwritten rules and with the swift 
emergence of new non-codified rules.  
For instance, a culture and informal behavioral traits linked to shortage have 
declined rapidly in all countries where a shift from a resource-constrained to a demand-
constrained economy has been realized in a few months or even a few weeks.14 Changes 
                                                 
12 When new formal rules were contrasting with the dominant transition doctrine, as in China’s dual-track 
reform system (with two channels of price formation in the state sector), they were criticized by 
mainstream economists as irrational  ; but they later appeared to have been instrumental in system 
change (Naughton 1995). 
13 Discussing informal rules which are endogenous to formal institutional structures, Helmke and Levitsky 
(2004) point to their diverse origins; they are created by actors because formal rules are incomplete; 
informality may be a “second best” strategy for actors who prefer, but cannot, achieve a formal 
institutional solution. One motivation for creating informal rules may be the pursuit of goals not 
considered to be publicly (or internationally) acceptable. 
14Kornai (2006) observes the volatility of memory: “People very easily forget; both collective and 
individual memories are highly unreliable. Decades ago, we were flooded with complaints from 
individuals because certain consumer items were unavailable: one had to wait many years for a car or an  
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in values and informal rules are often observed after a few years, as Ledeneva (1998) has 
documented in her study of transformational Russia with reference to success, 
individualism and efficiency.15 
Apparently similar informal rules, like labor hoarding in large Russian 
enterprises, assumed very different characteristics in the late socialist period and during 
the transformational crisis. The same change is also true for networking, as observed in 
Chinese guanxi (Wank 1999), Russian blat’ (Ledeneva 1998) or Hungarian “recombinant” 
networks (Stark and Bruszt 1998). 
That many new conventions have proved ephemeral in the wholesale process of 
system change is shown by the gambling craze, the success of financial pyramids in 
many countries or the early rush to West German products in the former GDR. 
Informal rules established among Russian oligarchs for wide-scale plundering of state 
assets in the loans-for shares scheme remained for no more than two years (Freeland, 
2000). « Robber barons » conventions in the middle of 1990s were followed after a 
period by increased submission to formal rules in business practices, some observers 
interpreting such change as a transformation of business “culture” … 
Conversely, the development of a barter economy in Russia during a period of 
acute monetary crisis that lasted around seven years in the 1990s gave rise to 
sophisticated and extended informal rules of exchange that even developed into 
elaborate schemes of compensation. Unwritten barter rules accompanying specific 
problems of Soviet planning had long existed in the previous system, but the post-
Soviet barter economy and its specific rules represented a genuine novelty where new 
informal relations were established and developed in a short (and eventually transitory) 
historical period. Another set of rapidly emerging informal rules was linked to the 
introduction of a (formal) dual-track system in China in the 1980s16 but this, too, proved 
to be relatively short-lived. 
8.  Detrimental Informality? 
Mainstream economic theory has a strongly implicit normative reference — 
Pareto optimality — deemed to be a situation beneficial for all members of society. It 
gives many economists this extraordinary self-confidence and peremptory attitude, 
provided by the conviction that efficiency and collective interest can be perfectly 
reconciled, so that “performance” is unambiguous. In this approach, formal institutions 
showing the “one best way” to optimality are supposed to be known, and informal rules 
consequently are often interpreted as detrimental — except when they correspond 
closely to the good formal rules. This taken-for-granted normative standard has strong 
                                                                                                                                          
apartment or a telephone line. Nowadays it seems that I, once the author of a book entitled Economics of 
Shortage (1980), will be left as the single individual in Eastern Europe, who still remembers the shortage 
economy and feels genuine joy that it is over. Chronic shortages have been replaced by abundant 
supplies. Nowadays, people grumble that we are awash in an incredible number of products, that prices 
are prohibitively expensive and that people are tormented by the ‘consumer society’.” 
15 Ledeneva also noted that it had become difficult to borrow money from friends in the Russia of the 
mid-1990s, whereas it was the most frequent support among friends in Soviet times, and that children 
were fast becoming money-conscious. She also observed a change from cooperation to secrecy in the 
academic world. Connections (blat’) used to be value-oriented, they became driven by considerations of 
self-interest and mutual profit, etc. (Ledeneva 1998). 
16 It became very common, for instance, for state enterprises to sell planned and low-priced state supplies 
on the free market for much higher prices.  
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links with equilibrium thinking, which makes genuine change difficult to understand or 
reduces it to a teleological “transition” to the beneficial systemic equilibrium. 
But efficiency and performance are problematic notions that make little sense in 
a historical context unless there is an answer to the questions, “efficiency for whom?”17 
and “which performance?” Likewise, different types of formal and informal rules and 
their interaction may create beneficial or detrimental consequences for different 
individuals or social groups. They may also have ambiguous or changing effects as time 
goes by.18 A normative evaluation by social scientists of these configurations in terms of 
given values or standards would be welcomed, as long as it was based on an explicit and 
open theoretical approach.  
The frequent reference to the standard of “transparency” in general, and in post-
socialist societies in particular, is an example of the implicit normative stance of 
mainstream economic theory: it implies that perfectly informed agents will act in a 
rational way, bringing about the optimal equilibrium predicted by the mainstream 
approach. More often than not, transparency is turned into a normative concept 
disguised as a technical requirement for efficiency. Keynesian uncertainty, Hayekian 
complexity and ignorance, Simonian bounded and procedural rationality, or Stiglitzian 
imperfect information are simply ignored or forgotten. Notably, the standard use of the 
notion of transparency implies that rules are or ought to be exclusively formal and 
spontaneously enforced; it overlooks the universal duality of formal and informal 
institutions in the economy and polity. It carries a double bias in postulating the 
rationality of formal rules and in assuming a negative character of informality. 
Beyond the mainstream transition doctrine, we also find little acknowledgment 
of the complexity of formal/informal relations. While Hayek gave positive weight to 
evolved or grown (informal) rules of just conduct, as mentioned earlier, the latter are of 
little help in explaining post-socialist change unless a very specific tradition is taken as 
genuine reference for cultural evolution,19 while others are rejected as poisoned by 
various forms of constructivism. The cultural reduction of informal rules linked to a 
negative assessment of their inertial role in transformation, as developed by North or 
caricatured by Pejovich, leaves no room for positive path-dependent informality or for 
innovative informal rules in the process of change. The former can be observed in the 
revived traditions of entrepreneurship in Poland or China, while examples of the latter 
are numerous, be they detrimental (corruption, cronyism, law evasion), beneficial (tax 
compliance) or ambiguous (labor hoarding, barter). Symmetrical examples could be 
easily listed in the history (or present-day situation) of venerable capitalist economies. 
                                                 
17Schmid observes that: “The problem with efficiency is that there are too many of them and thus 
efficiency gives no basis for choosing among them.” It takes a “moral choice of whose interests count” 
(Schmid 2004, p. 83). 
18Official rules may be replaced or complemented by informal arrangements through an “informalization 
of the rules:” “First, formal rules are imposed by the public officials in a way which leaves room for 
their discretion and creates a high level of uncertainty for market actors. Second, confronting high costs 
of compliance with the formal rules, economic agents create specific governance structures to avoid 
formal rules on a systematic basis. Third, public officials establish selective control, in which formal 
rules are used for extortion and selective pressures on economic agents. Fourth, economic agents, in 
turn, bargain with the public officials on terms and conditions of the implementation of formal rules. 
Fifth, multiple arrangements and interpretations are produced to legitimate practices of informalization” 
(Radaev 2004, p. 94). Informalization here carries a negative connotation. 
19 Hayek’s theory has been characterized as “romantic anglophilia” (O’Brien 1998).  
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9.  Beneficial Complementarity? 
New institutional theories often display an implicitly normative stance where 
formal rules — or conversely, informal evolved rules — are given a positive value in 
general. The harmony of formal and informal institutions is predominantly seen as a 
good model or idealized type providing a normative standard to evaluate given 
situations or processes of change. However, post-socialist transformation has again 
shown the great evolving diversity of rule configurations that may arise in the process of 
historical change, suggesting that implicitly normative models may be misleading when 
confronted with historically specific trajectories of transformation. 
The normative harmony model is sometimes qualified. Winiecki (2000) suggests 
in a neo-liberal spirit that informal rules may reduce the detrimental effects of misguided 
formal institutions. Adopting a new institutional approach, the 2002 World Bank 
Development Report stated that “one size does not fit all in institutional design,” seeming 
to admit context specificity. Furthermore, it observed: “Where informal institutions 
operate effectively, and when formal institutions require supporting institutions, 
building new formal institutions may not be a priority for policymakers.” It suggested 
“accepting informal institutions when formal institutions would not have their desired 
impact” (World Bank 2002). A less normative stance was thus suggested, but this has 
remained a minority position in the literature and in policy advice. 
The notion of institutional complementarity (Aoki 2001; Amable 2003) stresses 
interdependencies and reinforcement processes between (formal) institutions in 
different economic or social domains or within the same domain. However, it does not 
deal with the relationship between formal and informal rules or institutions; neither does 
it consider the possibility of perverse reinforcement, as in a case where a given beneficial 
institution leads to the consolidation of negative but interdependent institutions. It may 
be made less static and extended for that purpose.20 
10. Conclusion 
Post-socialist transformation and the great variety of national trajectories of 
system change, as well as the diversity of emerging post-socialist capitalisms, confirm 
that informal institutions and rules do matter. The interdependence of formal and 
informal rules in the process of historical change is now widely acknowledged. 
However, reductionist or biased theories may perpetuate obstacles to an open approach 
on this important theme through a one-sided focus on either informal rules or formal 
rules, or a hypothetical equilibrium between both. Normative models of “good rules,” 
or of formality- or informality-centered harmony between the two types of institutions, 
linked to a one-sided assessment of efficiency and performance, can distort the analysis 
of system dynamics. 
Differential change in formal and informal institutions takes very diverse forms 
in different evolutionary or revolutionary circumstances. Context dependence and 
historical specificity lead to a great variety of configurations of the relationship between 
formal and informal rule changes. A better understanding of such diversity poses a 
stimulating challenge for future research. 
                                                 
20 Systemic coherence (Kornai 1992) is a concept with an even higher degree of abstraction compared to 
institutional complementarity. The first concerns system families (such as capitalism and socialism), 
while the second is about stylised historical forms of national capitalisms. 
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